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Disability Grants and Individual and 
Household Welfare among HAART 






Objective: To examine whether the loss of disability grants creates perverse 
incentives to forego treatment and negatively impacts health and economic 
welfare among individuals on highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) in 
South Africa. 
 
Design: Three-year panel study of a sample of individuals in Khayelitsha (a 
large, poor black township in Cape Town, South Africa) on HAART. 
 
Methods: Descriptive cross-tabulations and multivariate individual fixed effects 
regressions using self-reported health status, adherence to treatment, individual 
and household incomes and employment status as dependent variables and a 
binary indicator of disability grant status as the main independent variable. 
 
Results: We found no statistically significant association between grant receipt 
and adherence to treatment, self-reported health status, or side effects from 
HAART. None of the individuals in the sample reported that they would be 
willing to forego treatment to remain eligible for grants and all respondents 
reported perfect or near perfect adherence to treatment. However, a loss of a 
disability grant was associated with substantial decreases in individual and 
household incomes, respectively.  
 
Conclusion: While we found no evidence of people trading off their health for 
income, there still appears to be a large financial burden associated with 
disability grant loss, which could increase the salience of perverse incentives, 
especially among those who are unable to find employment. Future research 
should examine alternative social welfare programs for AIDS-sick individuals 




HIV/AIDS is an important public health and policy issue in South Africa. 
Recent estimates suggest that nearly 20% of all adults aged 20-64 in the country 
are infected with this disease (Actuarial Society of South Africa, 2005). Policies 
to address the adverse health and socioeconomic consequences of HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa include public sector provision of highly active antiretroviral 
therapy (HAART) and the disability grant, a cash transfer program targeting 
individuals who are deemed too sick or incapacitated to work and who meet an 
income-based means test (Department of Social Development - Republic of 
South Africa, 2007).  
 
The disability grant is a small but growing component of South Africa’s 
relatively generous and well-developed social security system. The number of 
individuals receiving disability grants has more than doubled since 2000, rising 
to 1.4 million recipients in 2008, with much of this growth attributable to 
increases in the number of AIDS-sick people (Department of Social 
Development - Republic of South Africa, 2003, Department of Social 
Development - Republic of South Africa, 2006, Nattrass, 2006b, Nattrass, 
2006a, National Treasury (Republic of South Africa), 2008). Government grants 
in general, and the disability grant and old age pension in particular (the two 
largest transfers), are highly redistributive. Poor households with access to such 
grants are significantly better off than comparable households without 
pensioners or disability grantees  (Booysen and Van der Berg, 2005, Case and 
Deaton, 1998, Duflo, 2000, Edmonds, 2006, Hardy and Richter, 2006, Koker et 
al., 2006, Leclerc-Madlala, 2006, Nattrass, 2006b, Simchowitz, 2004, Edmonds 
et al., 2005).   
 
Disability grants are awarded either on a ‘temporary’ basis (payments are 
provided up to one year, whereupon the individual has to reapply for further 
benefits) or on a ‘permanent’ basis (requiring renewal every five years) 
(Department of Social Development - Republic of South Africa, 2007). 
Individuals lose eligibility once they become healthy enough to re-enter the 
labor force. However, because of high rates of unemployment, particularly 
among black South Africans, the loss of a disability grant is not necessarily 
followed by a shift into employment. Indeed, many people who lose their grants 
may find themselves trapped in a state of unemployment, with serious 
consequences for individual and household welfare.  
 
For individuals who are AIDS-sick, those receiving treatment generally have 
their health restored within six months (Graff-Zivin et al., 2006, Smit et al., 
2006, Thirumurthy et al., 2005). These individuals should lose their disability 
grants, as they are no longer too sick to work. However, if the person is unable 
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to find work after the disability grant has been terminated, and if they cannot 
borrow from formal institutions or extended family/social networks, then they 
may find their health threatened once again – most obviously by poor nutrition 
(which undermines the person’s immune system and reduces the effectiveness of 
HAART).   
 
Consequently, policymakers and researchers are concerned that individuals on 
HAART may have to choose between adhering to treatment and losing the 
disability grant, or defaulting on treatment in order to get sick enough to have 
the grant renewed (Leclerc-Madlala, 2006, Nattrass, 2006b, Nattrass, 2006a, 
Simchowitz, 2004, Hardy and Richter, 2006). That is, the disability grant system 
may create perverse incentives for individuals living with HIV/AIDS to forego 
treatment in order to maintain their income. Given that the number of people 
losing their disability grants per year is likely to rise to about half a million by 
2010 (Nattrass, 2006a), this potential trade-off could have serious social 
implications and may contribute to the development of resistance to HAART 
(Bangsberg et al., 2004).  The aim of this study is to conduct the first 
quantitative evaluation of the effects of disability grant loss on adherence to 
treatment and health and economic welfare in South Africa by using a unique 






Setting and Data 
 
Data used in this study were collected in Khayelitsha, a large black township of 
over 500,000 people situated southeast of central Cape Town.  Khayelitsha is an 
overcrowded mix of formal housing and informal (shack type) houses, but most 
residents are poor and live in corrugated iron shacks without running water.  
Unemployment rates in the area are around 51% (City of Cape Town, 2005). 
Antenatal clinic data indicate an HIV prevalence of 33% (Shaikh et al., 2006). 
 
In 2004/2005 the AIDS and Society Research Unit (ASRU) at the University of 
Cape Town initiated the HAART Panel Study to investigate the impact of long-
term HAART on the lives of people living with AIDS. The study aimed to 
recruit as many people who had participated in the pilot HAART roll-out 
program conducted in Khayelitsha by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in 
collaboration with the Western Cape Provincial government. This program, the 
first public provision of HAART in Africa, started in May 2001 and, by 2004, 
more than a thousand Khayelitsha residents had commenced treatment (Coetzee 
et al., 2004a, Coetzee et al., 2004b, Médecins Sans Frontières, 2003).  
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Because of patient confidentiality issues, there was no sample frame upon which 
to draw a representative random sample. Consequently, a snowball sample of 
242 individuals who had been on HAART for at least a year was recruited 
through social networks via word of mouth and contacts with clinics and support 
groups. Over two thirds of those who joined the MSF pilot HAART project in 
2001 were recruited into the study, as were over a third of the total known 
cohort of people in Khayelitsha who had been on HAART for longer than a 
year. The sample was re-interviewed in early 2006 and late 2007. 
 
The HAART Panel sample is suitable for the purposes of this study for three 
reasons.  First, Khayelitsha is a relatively poor area and, consequently, the 
majority of the sample would be eligible for the disability grant.  Second, 
Khayelitsha is known to afford residents relatively easy access to social welfare 
organizations.  Thus, a high proportion of eligible adults in Khayelitsha can be 
expected to be accessing disability grants. Third, as HAART has restored many 
of the participants’ health it is likely that disability grant loss would be reported 





In order to examine trends in adherence to treatment, health, economic status 
and disability grant receipt, we calculated descriptive statistics for the individual 
and household welfare outcomes for each of the three survey waves. These 
statistics were computed for the entire sample and for those receiving disability 
grants to assess the potential impacts of grant loss. We also followed health and 
economic status over time for those individuals who lost disability grants 
between the first and second rounds of the survey by subsequent employment 
status to assess whether the impact of grant loss varied by whether or not an 
individual could find work.   
 
Our measures of treatment adherence included both a 1 – 10 Likert scale, with 
10 being perfect adherence, and a binary measure from the 2007 wave indicating 
whether the individual would hypothetically forego treatment to continue 
receiving disability grants. The specific health outcomes were self-reported 
health status (1 - 5 Likert scale, with 1 being poor and 5 being excellent health) 
and side effects experienced (a scale from 0 – 12, reflecting the number of 
different types of side effects). We considered side effects as these might reflect 
reduced efficacy of HAART in conditions where nutritional intake is 
compromised due to loss of income. For economic status, we used a binary 
measure of employment in the month preceding the interview and individual and 
household incomes (inclusive of all wages, profits, remittances, and grants). 
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Individual fixed effects regressions were then used to examine impacts of grant 
loss. Specifically, disability grant receipt was used as the main independent 
variable, with adherence to treatment, health (self-reported health status and side 
effects), employment, income, and household demographic characteristics 
(household size, number of pensioners, and number of children) as dependent 
variables. We included the demographic variables as previous research has 
shown them to be responsive to social welfare transfers (Edmonds et al., 2005). 
All specifications included binary indicators for survey wave, and interactions 
between survey wave and age, education, length of time since commencing 
HAART, and gender to account for time effects and differential trends, 
respectively.  
 
We used individual fixed effects to control for time invariant unobservable 
characteristics that may be jointly correlated with disability grant receipt and 
individual and household welfare outcomes. For example, those who receive 
grants may be worse off/poorer than those who do not, thus leading to 
underestimates of the impact of grant loss. The bias may work in the opposite 
direction as well: those who receive grants may be better able to navigate the 
social security system using skills that are also beneficial in gaining employment 
and sustaining health. Fixed effects would account for both types of bias. 
 
However, several issues arise with the use of fixed effects regressions. First, 
such models would be prone to bias from reverse causality. In our case, because 
grants are allocated based on health status, estimates from fixed effects models 
may reflect the effect of changes in health on grant status rather than the other 
way around. More generally, fixed effects models do not account for time-
varying characteristics, such as unobserved changes in family circumstances, 
which may influence both grant receipt and individual and household health 
outcomes.  
 
Second, fixed effects models would not capture important and plausible 
behavioral responses to the potential of grant loss. For example, if individuals 
forego or modulate their treatment regimen just before their grant comes up for 
renewal, and consequently, remain on disability grants, our estimates of the 
impact of grant loss on health would be downward biased. Put differently, our 
fixed effects estimates would be erroneously biased towards concluding that 
individuals do not forego treatment for economic security when this is actually 
the case. 
 
We addressed these issues in several ways. Our main approach was to compare 
the fixed effects coefficients to those gleaned from instrumental variable 
models, where we used reported grant renewal prior to the first survey wave as 
an instrument for grant receipt status. We contend that grant renewals are 
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correlated with the type of grant that the individual may have initially received 
(‘permanent grants’ would not require renewal, whereas ‘temporary’ grants 
would), and therefore also with the likelihood of having a grant at any given 
time. Qualitative evidence suggests that doctors vary greatly in how stringently 
they follow disability grant laws and with regard to their propensities for 
prescribing ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ grants (De Paoli et al., 2008). Thus, 
conditional on individual fixed effects, the type of disability grant an individual 
initially received may essentially be random. Under these assumptions, grant 
renewal would be an ideal instrumental variable in that it would predict who 
loses grants but would not affect (changes in) adherence, health and 
socioeconomic status directly. Put differently, with the use of this instrument, 
we can be confident that grant loss is not determined by any of our outcome 
variables or by unobserved time varying characteristics. In addition, the 
instrumental variable strategy also helps address the concerns of dynamic 
behavior, where people modulate their treatment just prior to when their grants 
come up for renewal. 
 
Our second approach addresses the latter scenario more directly; we followed 
self-reported health and side effects over time for those individuals in the bottom 
quartile of the income distribution, by disability grant status. Results from the 
SMART trial suggest that frequent breaks from treatment lead to poorer health 
and more side effects (SMART, 2006). As such, if individuals were actually 
foregoing treatment for short periods of time to renew their grants, we would 
expect the poorest individuals in the sample to experience worsening health and 
side effects over time, and that this trend may be steeper for those receiving 
disability grants. 
 
As our last approach to address issues in fixed effects regression models we 
assessed the robustness of the disability grant coefficient across models with and 
without gender, age and education specific trends (i.e., interactions between 
dummies for survey wave and these baseline characteristics). To the extent that 
these trends are correlated with important time-varying characteristics, robust 
estimates would be consistent with the fixed effects estimates reflecting causal 
effects.   
 
Finally, we investigated possible biases due to attrition across the survey waves. 
We used regression techniques to model the probability of leaving the panel 
study as a function of age, gender, level of education, employment status, 







Sample characteristics, calculated from the first wave of the survey, are 
presented in Table 1. The vast majority of respondents (79%) were women.1 The 
mean age was 34 years, and most individuals had completed an average of 9.5 
years of schooling. Finally, 74% of respondents reported receiving a disability 
grant.   
 
Table 1. Baseline characteristics for HAART Panel Study. 
  Sample 
Size 
Percent Range Mean 
Total  242    
Gender men 50 21%   
women 192 79% 
Age    20-64 34 years 
old 
Education none 5 2% 0-12 
years 
9.45 years 
primary 42 17% 






no 63 26%   
yes 179 74% 
 
 
Table 2 presents means for household and individual income, self-reported 
health and number of side effects, and the proportions of individuals employed, 
by sample year and by receipt of disability grant. Importantly, all individuals 
reported perfect or near perfect adherence (9 or 10 out of 10 on the Likert scale) 
across all three survey waves. In addition, not a single individual indicated that 
they would “stop taking ARVs” to “get (back) [their] disability grant.” 2 We do 
not report these results in the table given the lack of variation in adherence 
behaviors.  
 
Table 2 highlights three main points. First, disability grant receipt appeared to be 
strongly associated with individual and household income. Among disability 
grant recipients, grant income constituted the majority of individual income 
                                                 
1 This reflects the fact that women are more vulnerable to HIV than men (so one would expect 
more women than men to be AIDS-sick) and that men are less likely than women to 
participate in HAART programs, and seek medical treatment more generally (Nattrass, 2008). 
2 It should be noted, however, that 10% of respondents in 2007 agreed that “it is a common 
strategy for HIV-infected people who have lost their disability grant to become sick again to 
get the grant back.” 
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(almost two thirds in 2004/5 and 2006, and 56% in 2007) and about 40% of 
household income. Second, disability grant receipt did not appear to be 
associated with health outcomes. Third, the disability grant system did not 
appear to have operated as intended: the majority of the individuals receiving 
disability grants reported being in good or excellent health and nearly a third of 
all grant recipients in the sample were employed in 2004/5 and 2006 (43% of 
grant recipients were working in 2007).3 In addition, of the 42 individuals who 
started receiving disability grants before 2002, exactly half continued to report 
receipt in 2007 (not shown here). Even under the assumption that these 
individuals were issued permanent (five-year) grants, all of these grants should 
have been terminated. 4   
 
                                                 
3 Not only did individuals continue to receive grants after commencing employment, but 
several individuals actually started receiving grants while being engaged in steady wage or 
self-employment over the previous year (not shown here). 
4 We also estimated individual fixed effects regression models for disability grant receipt in 
order to explore these results further (not shown here). We regressed disability grant status on 
dummy variables for survey wave, and trends in self-reported health, employment, age, 
gender, time since commencing HAART and education. These results also suggest that the 
disability grant system did not work as intended: disability grant status was uncorrelated with 
the self-reported health and employment status trend variables and individuals who had been 
on HAART longer were less likely to lose a disability grant over time. If the grant allocation 
system were working as intended, we would expect less healthy, unemployed individuals who 
recently commenced HAART to be more likely to hold grants over time. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for employment, health and income by 
year and disability grant receipt. 
 2004 2006  2007 
Complete Sample:    
Sample size 242 224  216 
Disability grant recipients (%) 74 46 42 
Employment (% working in month preceding interview) 34 42 52 
Average individual income (Rands/month) 1,044 968 1,099 
Average household income (Rands/month) 1,899 1,735 2,028 
    
Self-reported health (1-5 scale, 5 – excellent) 3.71 3.58 3.91 
Side effects (number experienced) 2.60 3.15 2.14 
    
Disability grant recipients:    
Sample size 178 104 90 
Employment (% working in month preceding interview) 30 32 43 
Average individual income (Rands/month) 1,133 1,113 1,238 
Contribution of disability grant to individual income (%) 65 65 59 
Average household income (Rands/month) 1,920 1,826 2,134 
Contribution of disability grant to household income (%) 39  40  34  
    
Self-reported health (1-5 scale, 5 – excellent) 3.75 3.61 3.89 
Side effects (number experienced) 2.61 3.43 2.78 
Note: Income measures for 2006 and 2007 were adjusted to 2004 values to account for 
inflation.  
 
Table 3 explores the potential negative effects of grant loss on health and 
income by following individuals whose disability grant was terminated (and not 
renewed) between the first two survey waves. On average, an individual who 
lost a disability grant reported significantly lower personal income in 2006, 
though this appears to have rebounded slightly in 2007 (see first panel of table). 
Household income showed a similar pattern, though the declines were smaller in 
relative and absolute terms. This suggests the presence of coping mechanisms 
among households, extended families and social networks that helped smooth 
income in response to the loss of grants. However, our results also suggest that 
these coping mechanisms may have been incomplete: household income fell 
substantially and had not recovered more than two years after the loss of the 
disability grant. The adverse effects of this drop in income would be accentuated 
if income and consumption are linked, as is likely among this poor sample. 
 
For individuals losing disability grants who were unable to find employment 
(see second panel of Table 3), the situation was direr: personal income dropped 
by over 95% and household income fell by nearly 50%. While these individuals 
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reported increases in all measures of income in the final survey round, the 
turnaround was small in comparison to the initial decline. In addition, 
unemployed individuals reported being in slightly worse health and a greater 
number of side effects from HAART immediately after losing their grants, 
though these outcomes rebounded in the final survey wave.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for health and income by year and by 
employment status for those who lost disability grants between 2004 and 
2006. 
 2004/05 2006  2007 
Individuals who lost the disability grant between 
the 2004/05 and 2006 surveys 
   
Sample Size 65 65 55 
Employment (% working in month preceding 
interview) 
34 43 60 
Average individual income (Rands/month) 1,259 574 874 
Average household income (Rands/month) 2,049 1,669 1,727
    
Self-reported health (1-5 scale, 5 – excellent) 3.90 3.64 4.07 
Side effects (number experienced) 2.42 2.81 2.01 
    
Unemployed individuals who lost the disability 
grant between the 2004/05 and 2006 surveys  
   
Sample size  37 22 
Average individual income (Rands/month)  61 181 
Average household income (Rands/month)  1,117 1,247
    
Self-reported health (1-5 scale, 5 – excellent)  3.55 3.88 
Side effects (number experienced)  3.76 2.50 
Notes:   Income measures for 2006 and 2007 were adjusted to 2004 values to account for 
inflation.  
 
Results for fixed effects models evaluating the potential effects of disability 
grants on various measures of individual and household welfare are presented in 
Table 4. To reduce clutter, we only report coefficients on the disability grant 
variable. The first panel of the table illustrates results for logged income 
(individual and household) and employment. The estimates suggest that losing a 
disability grant was associated with a 74% decrease in personal income 
(coefficient/[coefficient + 1]). The results for household income suggest a 
similar pattern, though the percentage decreases are much smaller (43%). As 
mentioned previously, this could reflect the effect of consumption and income 
smoothing mechanisms among families and other social networks. We found no 
association between disability grant status and employment status.  
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In the second panel of Table 4, we present results for self-reported health and 
side effects from treatment. We found no statistically significant association 
between disability grant receipt and the health status indicators. The findings in 
this panel, as well as those presented in the first panel, are consistent with those 
gleaned from Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Finally, the third panel of Table 4 illustrates the association between disability 
grant receipt and household demographics. We found a strong positive 
association between grant status and the number of children under the age of 10. 
We found no statistically significant associations between total household size 
or the number of pension eligible elderly living in the household and disability 
grant status. Collectively, these findings suggest that the share of dependents in 
the household decreased in response to disability grant loss, which is consistent 




Table 4. Fixed effects regression estimates of the association between 
disability grant receipt and individual and household welfare. 
Panel 1 - Economic Variables       
 Individual Incomea Household Incomea Employment 
Disability Grant 2.80* 0.764* -0.032 
 (0.240) (0.156) (0.055) 
    
Sample Size 682 655 682 
     
Panel 2 - Health Variables       
 Self-Reported Health  Side Effects  
Disability Grant 0.149 0.012  
 (0.129) (0.385)  
    
Sample Size 679 682   
    
Panel 3 - Demographic Variables      
 Household Size No. Under 10 No. Pension Eligible
Disability Grant 0.043 0.211* 0.003 
 (0.196) (0.085) (0.045) 
    
Sample Size 680 680 680 
      
Notes: -Standard errors in parentheses 
-a The natural logs of individual and household income. Zero values for the income 
variables were coded as 1. 
-* statistically significant at 5% level 
-All models include dummy variables for 2006 and 2007 survey waves, and the 
interaction between these variables and baseline age, time since commencing HAART 
and education and gender. 
-Disability Grant: binary indicator = 1 if individual is a current recipient. 
-Employment: binary indicator = 1 if the individual reported wage or self-employment 
in the month preceding the interview. 
-Self-reported health: 1 – 5 Likert Scale, with 1 being poor health and 5 excellent 
health. 
-Side effects: the total number of different side effects experienced (up to 12 possible) 
-Household size, No. Under 10 and No. Pension Eligible: total number of household 
members in each category, respectively. 
 
Our robustness checks indicated that our fixed effects estimates were likely 
unbiased and represent causal effects (not shown here). First, the instrumental 
variable coefficients were substantively similar to those presented in Table 4, 
though, as expected, the standard errors on the estimates were much larger. 
Second, we found no evidence that the health of poorest individuals in the 
sample, whether receiving disability grants or not, declined over the study 
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period, suggesting that frequent breaks from treatment were not taken during the 
sample period. This evidence was consistent with the individual self-reports on 
adherence. Third, our estimates and substantive conclusions were robust to the 
exclusion of age, gender and education specific time trends. Finally, survey 
attrition was low (11%) and only age was found to be a significant predictor of 
dropping out of the sample in subsequent regression analysis. Collectively, this 
evidence suggests that our results were not substantially biased by reverse 
causality, omitted time-varying factors, and attrition, and that treatment stoppage 
in anticipation of grant renewals or loss was not a prevalent practice among the 





The disability grant program is an important part of South African policy 
towards persons living with AIDS. Individuals who become AIDS-sick are 
eligible to receive this large transfer payment, which is intended to support them 
until they become well enough to work. However, upon grant termination, many 
individuals may be unable to find work due to high levels of unemployment, 
which could create perverse incentives to forego treatment in order to stay sick 
enough to remain eligible for grant payments.   
 
The aim of our study was to examine whether the loss of disability grants had 
negative effects on adherence to treatment, health and economic status using 
data from a unique panel survey of individuals on HAART in Khayelitsha, 
South Africa. Our core findings are that disability grant loss was not associated 
with poor adherence or worsening health outcomes. Not a single individual in 
the sample reported an intention to trade-off grant eligibility for their health and 
all respondents reported perfect or near perfect adherence to treatment. On the 
other hand, we found that individual and household income did decline 
significantly with the loss of disability grants and that this fall was much steeper 
for those who were unable to find employment. Households appeared to 
partially compensate for the loss of grant income, and we found evidence that 
altering the demographic composition of the household away from dependents 
may have been one of the mechanisms used to achieve this. 
 
Our results with respect to adherence and health do not support qualitative and 
anecdotal evidence that individuals may forego or modify treatment in order to 
continue receiving disability grant transfers. This is despite the fact that 
individuals who lost grants, especially those who were not employed, 
experienced large decreases in their own and their household’s income. The 
discrepancy in the findings regarding adherence/health and income may be 
explained by households compensating for the loss of a disability grant in ways 
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that do not require one to sacrifice their health. For example, as our results 
indicated, one such compensation mechanism was altering household 
composition. Along these lines, our findings that the disability grant system did 
not work as intended suggests that individuals may have had ample 
opportunities to game the system, which may have precluded the need to forego 
treatment. Finally, individuals may not have been willing to trade-off their 
health under any circumstances, as the disutility from becoming AIDS-sick 
again far outweighs the loss of income or consumption. These points warrant 
further research attention.  
 
The discrepancy between our results and the qualitative evidence may be 
explained by differences in sampling. It is possible that the individuals who self-
selected into the HAART Panel Study, who were recruited through social 
networks, were healthier, wealthier and more likely to adhere to treatment than 
the average individual on HAART and/or those interviewed in the qualitative 
studies. Thus, our sample may exclude those people who are most sensitive to 
income loss and most likely to forego treatment as a result. However, the impact 
of sample selection bias on our results and conclusions may be limited given 
that we found no evidence of foregoing treatment or adverse health effects even 
among those respondents who lost their disability grant and did not find 
employment thereafter. These individuals lost nearly half of their household 
income and showed little recovery even two years (or more) after grant loss. 
 
Aside from questions regarding the generalizability of our results, there are other 
limitations in our study. First, self-reported measures for adherence and health 
may be prone to reporting bias. For example, individuals may be reluctant to 
admit incomplete adherence. Future research should seek to use objective 
indicators, such as viral loads or CD4+ counts. Second, despite the use of fixed 
effects and instrumental variables, there may still be doubt as to whether our 
results reflect causal relationships. While our results were highly robust to 
changes in specification and estimator, future research should look into further 
sources of exogenous variation in disability grant receipt to achieve greater 
confidence in recovering causal effects.   
 
In terms of policy implications, while our results suggest that individuals on 
HAART do not forego treatment to remain on disability grants, there still 
appears to be a large financial burden associated with grant loss, which could 
increase the salience of perverse incentives, especially among those who are 
unable to find employment. Future research should examine alternative social 
welfare programs for AIDS-sick individuals that do not assume that individuals 
can find work after they stop receiving transfers, thus reducing incentives to 
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